Whom should we believe? Information content of the yield curve and analysts’ expectations by Péter Gábriel & Klára Pintér
INTRODUCTION
The MNB can influence only short-term interest rates direct-
ly by setting its policy rate. The maturity of the policy rate is
two weeks, but the decisions of economic agents depend
on longer-term interest rates. Financial market participants’
expectations regarding future central bank rates constitute
the link between short-term and long-term interest rates.
The better the intentions of the central bank are reflected in
these expectations, the greater the harmony between the
decisions of firms and individual agents and economic fun-
damentals. Therefore, for monetary policy to be efficient,
the central bank must be able to shape the expectations of
market participants. However, the central bank must have
some information about these expectations in order to be
able to influence them effectively.
As market expectations can not be observed directly, their
measurement is far from easy. There are two main
approaches to extracting information on the expectations
of market participants. A straightforward way of obtaining
information about expectations is to ask market partici-
pants directly what they think the central bank policy rate
will be in the future. Indeed, in practice there are several
firms conducting and publishing such surveys. But inter-
preting the survey results is not straightforward at all, as it
is not clear which behaviour and motivations are reflected
in the answers. If the analysts surveyed want to give the
best possible forecast, they report the expected value of
the future central bank rate. However, there is nothing
pushing them to do so, and therefore the forecasts can
reflect a variety of motivations. For example, analysts might
be interested in avoiding large mistakes, or they may try
not to deviate much from the other respondents, or they
just do not want to change their prognosis too often. In
such cases, the survey does not reflect the best available
forecast of the future central bank policy rate.
The other possible approach is to measure the expecta-
tions of market participants indirectly, using prices
observed in financial markets. Various financial asset
prices depend on investors’ and traders’ expectations
regarding the future decisions of the central bank. The
closer the link between the price of an asset and the cen-
tral bank interest rates, the better the price reflects market
participants’ expectations regarding the future path of the
central bank policy rate. Moreover, as investors bet their
money on their expectations while trading, prices are like-
ly to reflect the best forecast of market participants. The
forward rates calculated from the prices of government
securities are natural choices for measuring expectations,
as the main determinant of government securities prices is
the path the central bank rate is expected to follow until the
maturity of the assets. However, government securities
prices are not determined by the path of the central bank
rate exclusively. Therefore, to interpret the expectations
reflected in the yield curve, we need to impose assump-
tions on other factors influencing the yields of government
securities.
In practice, central banks use both approaches, as each
one has its advantages and disadvantages, and neither is
able to completely depict the future path of the central
bank policy rate which market participants expect. In this
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Expectations of market participants play an important role in monetary policy making. The main reason for this is that
expectations influence the behaviour of investors and prices in financial markets. In this article, we present two sources
of information on the expectations of financial market participants regarding the central bank’s policy rate. Both the
yields of government securities and the survey of interest rate expectations conducted by Reuters contain information
on what the market expects the future path of the policy rate to be, but sometimes these two sources of information con-
vey substantially different messages. Our analysis helps to understand this phenomenon by shedding light on two key
factors behind it. On the one hand, forward rates calculated from the yield curve contain a risk premium and exceed the
expected value of the future central bank policy rate. On the other hand, analysts in the Reuters’ survey report the most
likely value of the future central bank policy rate as their forecasts, instead of the average value of all possible scenar-
ios. Finally, we claim that if the information from the two sources is interpreted properly – taking into account the previ-
ous factors – both sources contain valuable information for monetary policy making.article, we present a data source for both concepts: the
yield curve estimated using government securities prices
and the regular survey of market analysts conducted by
Reuters. Both sources shed light on the policy rate path
which the market participants expect to prevail over a
given future period. At the same time, as Chart 1 illustrates,
from time to time forward rates and analysts’ expectations
can differ substantially. Our analysis aims to offer a plausi-
ble explanation for this deviation. Furthermore, we argue
that it is worthwhile to monitor both sources and to use
them as measures of expectations, because despite the
inaccuracies both contain valuable information regarding
the future path of the central bank policy rate that is not
contained in the other. We focus on how accurately we can
forecast the future path of the central bank policy rate,
therefore for each data source we analyse whether the
measured expectations correspond to the expected value
of the future central bank rate.
YIELD CURVE BASED ESTIMATE OF
INTEREST RATE EXPECTATIONS
A widely used method to derive expectations regarding the
policy rate relies on forward rates calculated from the prices
of government securities.
1 The forward rate is equal to the
sum of the expected future interest rate and a term premium.
To understand this risk premium better, we can separate the
duration of the forward contract into two parts:
• The first period starts upon agreeing on the conditions
and ends when the security is purchased. When entering
into a forward contract, the parties fix the yield, and
therefore the investor runs the risk that the interest rates
may change before the price of the security must be paid
and at this future time he would be able to enter a spot
deal under different conditions than the pre-specified.
• The second period starts when the security is purchased
and ends upon its maturity. During this period, the risk
taken by the investor is the same as the risk of a spot
security purchase.
This distinction makes clear that the risk taken in a forward
contract is higher than the risk of a spot transaction, due to
the uncertainty in the initial period. The risk is mainly deter-
mined by the volatility of the spot interest rate during the
length of that period, between the date of concluding the
forward transaction and the actual purchase of the securi-
ty. The difference between the two interest rates – the term
premium – is the price of this additional risk; it compen-
sates investors for the uncertainty about future interest
rates in the first period.
Using the yields in the government securities market we
can estimate the risk premium, which enables us to infer
the anticipated path of the central bank policy rate. From
the yield curve we can directly derive the forward rate, i.e.
the sum of the expected future central bank rate and the
risk premium. Assuming that the risk premium is constant
over time for a given horizon of the forward yield, based on
a reasonably long time series of government securities
yields both the risk premium and the expected central
bank policy rate can be estimated. In this case, the risk
premium equals the average difference between the for-
ward rates of a given horizon and the subsequent central
bank rate outturns over a sufficiently long period. Once we
have obtained the average risk premium, we can calculate
the expected central bank policy rate for different horizons
at any particular point in time simply as the difference
between the forward rate and the estimated risk premium
for the corresponding horizon.
Chart 2 shows the risk premium for a range of horizons
from 1 to 12 months over the period June 2001 to April
2006. For comparison, we also include the corresponding
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1 In the case of a forward transaction the parties agree in the present time on the conditions of a contract starting at a pre-specified time in the future. For
example, a six month ahead three month forward transaction means an agreement concerning a yield, at which one of the parties is to purchase from
the other a given security with three-month maturity in six months time. The yield agreed upon is called the forward yield. The time between the date of
concluding the forward transaction and the purchase of the security (six months in the previous example) is referred to as the horizon of the forward yield.
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Central bank policy rate
Reuters survey in December
Forward curve in 
Decemberrisk premium for the United Kingdom.
2 Each bar shows the
range of the differences between the forward and subse-
quent spot interest rate outturns, with black diamonds indi-
cating the average risk premium.
3
The chart shows that although the average risk premium
was positive over the analysed time period, there were
days when the forward rate was below the subsequent
interest rate outturn. This indicates that during the horizon
of the forward rate new pieces of information arrive and
can lead to changes in the spot interest rates, so that the
actual interest rate outcome exceeds the level that was
previously expected. Moreover, the range of these differ-
ences increases with the horizon, probably reflecting the
greater uncertainty as market participants project further
out into the future. According to our estimates, the
Hungarian risk premium is higher, and the range of the dif-
ferences is wider than in case of the UK. As mentioned ear-
lier, the reason behind this is probably be the higher volatil-
ity of Hungarian interest rates.
Chart 3 shows the standard deviation of the Hungarian and
English short-term interest rate changes in our sample for
various horizons between 1 and 12 months. The charts also
show that there is a strong link between the estimated risk
premium and the volatility of spot interest rates. The standard
deviation of the interest rate changes – the measure of the
risk taken – increases faster with the horizon in the case of
Hungarian yields. Accordingly, at a longer horizon the range
of the differences between the forward rate and subsequent
spot interest rates widens more in the case of Hungary, and
the average risk premium increases faster as well.
Estimating the risk premium involves several problems.
First, the time series are relatively short, so the risk premi-
um can only be estimated with considerable uncertainty.
4
Furthermore our model assumes that the risk premium is
constant over time. External and internal economic devel-
opments and the risk appetite of investors were changing
during the period examined, which makes the assumption
of a constant risk premium an approximation at best.
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b) UK risk premium
2 The UK risk premiums are estimated using the same method. For a more detailed analysis of market expectations and risk premium in case of the United
Kingdom refer to Peacock (2004).
3 The risk premium for each horizon was estimated as the average difference between the forward rates and the subsequent spot interest rate outturns
corresponding to the particular horizon over the period June 2001 to April 2006. We excluded 2003 from the sample, because in this relatively short sam-
ple the large central bank rate changes in that year would lead to a significant bias in our estimates.
4 Before the widening of the exchange rate band and abolishment of capital controls, yields were not determined by the market only, e.g. the MNB inter-
vened more or less continuously on the exchange market. Hence, to estimate the risk premium we do not use yields before 15 June 2001.
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horizon (months)In  this section we have shown that forward yields calcu-
lated from the yield curve cannot be interpreted directly as
the expected value of the future central bank policy rate.
Forward yields reflect not only expectations, but a risk 
premium which grows in parallel with the horizon of the
forward rate. Therefore, the expected path of the central
bank policy rate is below the path drawn by the forward
rates.
INFORMATION CONTENT OF THE
REUTERS SURVEY
Reuters conducts a survey in the middle of every month,
querying financial market economists and research
institutions regarding their expectations of the central
bank policy rate at various pre-specified future dates
(the end of the next month, the end of the current year,
end of the next year). If the analysts were to give the
best available forecast, they would report the expected
value of the central bank policy rate at the specified
dates in the survey. However, the motivation of the ana-
lysts may differ, and the goal of a respondent may not
be to give the most accurate forecast. In this case, it is
not straightforward how to interpret the results of the
survey, and measuring the analysts’ expectations
requires a deeper analysis.
In the first part of this section we present some motives that
analysts may have and then we show how these motives
can be detected in the survey responses. Finally, we
explain how to interpret the forecasts of the analysts if they
report the most likely value of the future central bank poli-
cy rate instead of its expected value.
FORECASTING STRATEGIES OF
ANALYSTS
In addition to reporting the expected value of the future
central bank rate in the poll – rational forecasts – we will
consider three other possible forecasting strategies: adap-
tive projections, over-reacting projections and forecasting
the most likely value of the future central bank rate.
5
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5 Frankel and Froot (1985), Bakhshi et al. (2003) provide a more detailed description of these potential behaviours.
Chart 4
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c) Overreacting forecastThe first panel in Chart 4 illustrates the rational forecasts
that will serve as a starting point. Forecasting the expected
value of the future central bank policy rate will minimize the
forecast error, so analysts striving to give the best available
prediction will report a rational forecast. If new information
arrives and the expected central bank rate changes, the
new forecast reflects this change immediately. As new
pieces of information arrive randomly and frequently, ana-
lysts tend to revise their prognosis quite often in line with
changes in the expected future central bank rate.
However, analysts may assume that frequent changes in
forecasts jeopardize their reputation, so they attempt to
avoid sudden and significant revisions of their forecasts.
Panel b) illustrates this type of behaviour, referred to as
adaptive forecast. In this case, the projections incorporate
new pieces of information gradually, the changes in the
expected future interest rate are not fully transmitted into
the forecasts. If the previous forecast equalled the expect-
ed value, the next forecast will be between the new expect-
ed value and the previous forecast. This behaviour results
in smoother revisions of the forecasts relative to the ration-
al expectations.
Over-reacting forecasts (Panel (c)) have the opposite
effect. In this case market analysts assume that the per-
ceived changes in the expected future path of the central
bank rate will continue. Therefore, their revisions will follow
the direction of the change in the expected value of the
future central bank rate, but the magnitude of the change
in forecast will be greater.
Panel d) depicts a case where the density of the future
base rate is bimodal. Expectations can take this form, if
significantly different scenarios can take place in the fore-
casting period (e.g. if the central bank decides to raise the
interest rate, then the change will be quite large). In this
case, however, it is unlikely that the future interest rate out-
come will be close to the expected value. Therefore, if ana-
lysts report the expected value as their forecast, they will
be wrong with a fairly high degree of certainty. To avoid
this, analysts will build their forecast in two steps: first they
will select the scenario that they favour, and then they will
give the expected central bank policy rate corresponding
to the chosen scenario as their forecast. Consequently,
when analysts strive to maximize the number of relatively
accurate forecasts and put less weight on the magnitude
of forecasting errors, they will report the most likely value of




The analysts polled by Reuters are asked to give a forecast
each month for the central bank policy rate at various pre-
specified future dates. If the analysts intend to minimise their
forecast error, i.e. their forecasts are rational, then the fore-
cast of analyst i at period t for time t+s can be written as:
The analyst’s forecast is the sum of the expected value of
the future central bank rate and an error term. The latter
accounts for the fact that analysts do not know the expect-
ed value of the future interest rate precisely.
The subsequent policy rate outturn can be expressed as
the sum of its expected value and a random component,
where the latter comprises the effect of the shocks which
have occurred during the forecast period:
Based on the previous two equations, the latter can be
transformed as follows:
This equation can be tested using the following regression:
(1)
If the forecasts of analysts do not differ systematically from
the expected value of the future central bank interest rate,
the value of β will be 1. However, the estimated coefficients
of equation (1) only show us whether the forecasts of the
analysts are rational. If they are not, the equation does not
provide any further guidance to decide which strategies or
behaviours are reflected in the survey responses.
Nevertheless, we can interpret the results of the survey
properly only if we knew the type of forecasting behaviour
behind them. Projections motivated by the previously pre-
sented behaviours except rational expectations have one
aspect in common: the forecasts do not equal the expect-
ed value of the future interest rate. However, the prognoses
reflecting different behaviours are revised differently when
new information arrives. Accordingly, looking at the fore-
cast revisions could help us to detect which behaviour
applies to the analysts in our data set. To test this we use
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6 Bakhshi et al. (2003) provides a detailed description of the methodology we applied.(2)
The new variables show the change in the analyst’s fore-
cast in period t-1 and t-2. If the forecasts are rational, they
are only revised if new information emerges, and the
changes in the forecasts will be independent from previous
changes. In this case, the coefficient of both new variables
will be equal to 0. If γ or δ is positive, it means that analysts
tend to make smaller steps in altering their forecasts. If
they change their forecasts, they will do this gradually over
several months. The reason for a negative coefficient is
that analysts tend to overreact to perceived changes in
yields, in other words, their forecasts change more than
justified by the factors behind the changes in yields. The
results are shown in Table 1 for various forecast horizons.
According to our results analysts typically did not overre-
act or modify their forecasts in smaller steps (the estimat-
ed coefficients for revisiont-1 and revisiont-2 are not different
from 0).
8 The coefficient of the forecast, however, differs
from 1, which indicates that the forecast does not equal the
expected value of the future central bank rate, meaning
that the assumption of rational expectations is violated.
9
MODE VS. EXPECTED VALUE
In the previous section we demonstrated that the forecasts
in the Reuters survey do not, on average, equal the expect-
ed future central bank policy rate. The regressions do not
show signs of smooth forecast revisions, nor over-reacting
projections.
One plausible explanation for the observed systematic
deviation of analysts’ prognoses from the actual interest
rate outcomes can be that the forecasts are not rational, but
rather are based on the scenario with the highest probabil-
ity. This assumption may be motivated in the Hungarian
environment by the fact that expectations often incorporat-
ed big changes in interest rate that were likely to occur only
with small probability. For example, analysts might expect
that in case of an exchange rate crisis the central bank will
raise the interest rate significantly; yet the crisis is unlikely
to happen, so the central bank’s base rate will probably
remain unchanged. Accordingly there are two main scenar-
ios, one with a big policy rate increase and another with a
constant policy rate. In this case, the expected value of the
future policy rate – the weighted average of the central
bank base rate corresponding to the individual scenarios-
is an interest rate level highly unlikely to occur according to
analysts’ expectations. If the analysts’ objective is to
improve their chances to accurately predict the base rate,
in terms of the number of precise projections, their progno-
sis will not be the expected value of policy rate, they will
rather forecast the most likely outcome.
The available data does not allow us to test directly
whether analysts report in the poll the most likely interest
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Table 1
Forecast accuracy of the Reuters survey
7
Forecast horizon
1-5 months 6-11 months 12-17 months 18-23 months
Variable Estimated coefficient
Forecast 0.442 0.657 0.250 0.611
(0.121) (0.063) (0.107) (0.120)
Revision_1 0.627 -0.012 0.394 -0.117
(0.181) (0.128) (0.313) (0.221)
Revision_2 0.367 0.122 0.627 0.188
(0.124) (0.070) (0.113) (0.105)
Constant 0.026 0.029 0.018 0.009
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below the estimated parameters.
7 In this section we used the Reuters surveys conducted between December 1995 and January 2006 in our regressions. We omitted the observations which
were affected by the exceptional policy rate changes in 2003.
8 The estimated values of the coefficients γ and δ are very uncertain, therefore the results should be interpreted carefully.
9 In the estimated equation the explanatory variable and the error term are not independent, since both contain the error made by the analysts in their esti-
mation of the expected value. Hence, our estimate for the β coefficient is smaller than its true value. We have used some other estimation methods to
account for this bias, but the results obtained were similar. This means that the coefficient value below 1 is probably not due to the inadequate choice
of methodology. For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results here.check what coefficients can be estimated in the regres-
sion under equation (1), if this is the common analyst
behaviour.
The simulations are based on some simple assumptions.
• The economy can be in five states (a, b, c, d and e) with
equal probability, for which the future distributions of the
base rate are illustrated in the left panel of Chart 5.
• Analysts forecast the level of the base rate with the high-
est probability in the particular state, which in this case
could be 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
In the simulation, the estimated value of the coefficient was
less than one, on average 0.32 (Chart 5, right panel). This
means that the estimated coefficients in our regression
could be explained by the fact that analysts’ forecasts
show the most likely and not the expected value of the
future central bank policy rate.
10
If analysts report the most likely outcome, the forecast may
be interpreted as a conditional prognosis. The forecast
reflects the expected value of the future central bank base
rate in a case when an unlikely extraordinary event (for
example an unlikely yet substantial exchange rate depre-
ciation) does not occur.
COMPARISON OF THE FORECASTING
PERFORMANCE OF FORWARD
RATES AND ANALYSTS’ PROGNOSES
In the analysis so far we have argued that there are differ-
ent factors that drive a wedge between the expected value
of the future base rate and both forward rates and the fore-
casts of analysts. In this section we will discuss whether
they contain any useful information concerning the future
path of the central bank policy rate. Analysing the two
sources together we can assess to what extent they con-
vey the same information. We compare the forecasting
performance of the analysts’ survey expectations – repre-
sented by the average of the individual forecasts – and the
forward rates using the following regression:
(3) 
The coefficients in the equation indicate how strong the
relationship is between each variable and the policy rate.
Those variables, which contain information about the
expected interest rate path, are correlated with the future
central bank interest rate outcome, helping to explain its
changes. The coefficients of these variables differ from
zero.
The results in Table 2 show that neither the analysts’ fore-
casts nor the forward yields carry all the available informa-
tion. This follows from the fact that the coefficient of the cur-
rent base rate differs from zero at all forecast horizons, in
other words, the current central bank rate also contains
information concerning the future interest rate path in addi-
tion to the variables characterising market expectations. At
the same time, analysts’ forecasts help explain the future
base rate at all horizons. At forecast horizons below one
year, the forward rates fail to carry any information in addi-
tion to the analysts’ forecasts and the current level of the
base rate, whereas at forecast horizons over one year the
coefficients of all variables differ from zero. These results
indicate that in analysing market expectations within one
s t t t s t t s t t s t v r f forecast r + + + + + + + + = , , , δ γ β α
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10 As we could test only indirectly whether analysts indicated the most likely value in their forecast, our argument stands only as far as another alternative –
that can be tested indirectly as well – would result a lower coefficient than one in the analysed regression.year the focus should be on the market analysts’ forecasts,
and at a longer horizon both sources should be con-
sidered.
11
The results, however, do not necessarily mean that forward
yields carry no information at all for horizons within one
year. On the one hand, the forward yield is the sum of the
expected future central bank policy rate and the risk pre-
mium, hence it shows the upper limit of interest rate expec-
tations. On the other hand, the difference between the for-
ward yield and the survey expectations can be interpreted
as an estimate of the risk premium. The higher this differ-
ence, the greater the premium required by investors and
the vulnerability of the financial markets.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analysed market expectations concerning
the future path of the MNB’s policy rate using two sources
of information, the yield curve and the Reuters survey of
financial market analysts. We found that neither source
shows the expected value of future central bank rate
directly. The forward rates contain a risk premium which
pushes the forward curve above the expected future inter-
est rate path. The analysts’ forecasts in the Reuters survey
also differ from the expected future policy rate, which in
part may be explained by the fact that the respondents
report the most likely future interest rate outcome, rather
than the expected value. According to our findings, the
expected future interest rate path is between the two
curves in Chart 1, and it may be closer to the analysts’
expectations for forecast horizons of less than one year.
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Table 2
Forecast accuracy of forward yields and survey expectations 
Forecast horizon
1-5 months 6-11 months 12-17 months 18-23 months
Current reference interest  -0.434 -0.853 0.433 -0.886
rate (0.120) (0.179) (0.103) (0.230)
Forecast 1.487 2.245 1.703 2.200
(0.242) (0.177) (0.082) (0.220)
Forward yield -0.023 -0.139 -0.898 -1.454
(0.120) (0.077) (0.160) (0.147)
Constant -0.002 -0.016 -0.035 0.139
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.025)
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below the estimated parameters.
11 Nevertheless, for any timeframe over one year the problem remains that our observations are not unbiased since there is an overlap in the forecast peri-
ods, which makes the results within this timeframe less reliable.